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EXPERIMENTING WITH STATE-ENACTED RESALE RIGHTS
Guy A. Rub'
ABSTRACT

Currentfederal law does not requiresellers offine artto pay a share of the sale
price to the artists, although Congress andfederalagencies have been debating the
advantages and disadvantages of such a duty, commonly referred to as Artists'
Resale Rights (ARR), since the 1970s. What is often missingfrom this discourse is
the role that state law might play in this ecosystem. This issue, and especially
Cahfornia's1976 ARR law, the only state-enactedARR to date, is the focus of this
Article.
States are often saidto be the laboratoriesof democracy as they can experiment
with various legal rules andproduce rich comparative empirical data. The Article
explores whether states can be the laboratories of ARR as well. It reaches three
conclusions: First, there is a vibrant debate concerning the impacts and overall
desirability of resale royalties, but that debate is driven by relatively scarce
empiricaldata. Second, if states decide to adopt ARR they can provide some of that
missing information. Third, subject to minor restrictions, states are allowed to enact
ARR legislation, and the recent Ninth Circuitdecisions that held the CaliforniaARR
act unconstitutionalare, for the most part, misguided.

I Professor of Law, The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law. I would like to thank Adam
Thimmesch and the other participants in this symposium for valuable comments and Matt Krsacok for
outstanding research assistance. All remaining errors are my own.
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INTRODUCTION

States are often said to be the laboratories of democracy, meaning that they can
experiment with various legal rules and produce rich comparative empirical data
regarding the effectivity of those rules. Other states, as well as the federal
government, can use this information to improve their legal systems. This Article
explores this potential in one specific context-Artists' Resale Royalties (ARR).
Part I introduces the current debate concerning ARR, domestically and abroad.
When artists create works of fine art-e.g., paintings or sculptures-they have
property rights in those works. They can, therefore, sell those works to an interested
buyer. But in some jurisdictions, artists are entitled to another source of income-a
right to be paid royalties every time their works are resold. Since 1920, when France
enacted the first ARR statute, more than seventy countries adopted such a mandatory
scheme.
Since the late 1970s, Congress has considered, but never enacted, resale rights
on a federal level. At about the same time-the 1970s-state legislators around the
country considered enacting such rights in their jurisdictions. Specifically, during the
second half of the 1970s, resale royalty bills were introduced in at least nine states, 2
although only in California has such a bill passed.3 In the last few years, the Ninth
Circuit held that the California act is, with minor exceptions, unconstitutional. 4
This Article explores the potential for state-enacted ARR from three
perspectives. First, in Part II, the Article presents the potential for experimentalism
in connection with ARR. The desirability of ARR is subject to a fierce debate, both
domestically and abroad. That debate focuses on the potential impacts of ARR on
the primary and secondary markets for artwork, its effects on prices, and its
distributive impact.' Part II explores those conflicting arguments regarding the
impact of ARR, and shows how those claims, in many cases, are supported by scarce
empirical data.
Part 171 addresses the role that states can play in providing this missing data. It
explains that while states can typically experiment with legal solutions, doing so with
ARR will likely yield somewhat helpful yet limited results. The secondary art
markets in many states, for example, might be too small to produce meaningful ARR
data. In addition, an ARR scheme can be circumvented, which will undermine some
of the validity of the data produced from state-enacted ARR.
2Those states include California, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and
Texas. See infra note 53.
3 CAL. CIV. CODE § 986 (West 2019).
4

Close v. Sotheby's, Inc., 894 F.3d 1061, 1064 (9th Cir. 2018) (holding that the California law is

expressly preempted by the Copyright Act with respect to resales that occurred after January 1, 1978);

Sam Francis Found. v. Christies, Inc., 784 F.3d 1320, 1322 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (holding that the
California law violates the dormant Commerce Clause with respect to out-of-state sales).
s The primary market for artwork consists of the initial sales by or on behalf of the creating artists
while a secondary market is defined negatively as any sale that is not part of the primary market. See What
is the Difference Between the Primary and Secondary Art Market?, PICASSOMIO,
https://www.picassomio.com/art-appreciation/what-is-the-difference-between-the-primary-andsecondary-art-market.html [https://perma.cc/44TX-6WME].
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Part IV concludes the discussion by considering the constitutionality of
state-enacted ARK It does so by taking a critical look at the recent Ninth Circuit
decisions that held California's ARR act unconstitutional. This Part explains that,
from many perspectives, ARR resembles a state tax, and such taxes are typically
enforceable. Indeed, it seems that the Ninth Circuit did not fully address the nuances
of the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine before it used it to strike down the
California statute as it applied to out-of-state transactions.6
The Ninth Circuit decision that found that the Copyright Act preempts the
California statute,' even with respect to domestic transactions, is similarly lacking.
In it, the Ninth Circuit ignored or at least downplayed the role that state laws already
play-and must play-in creating and sustaining markets for information goods.
Those state laws are vital for the operation and the success of the federal law scheme.
Therefore, it seems inaccurate to suggest, as the Ninth Circuit implied, that states
cannot enact ARR legislation simply because they are precluded from affecting the
copyright holder's exclusive right (under federal law) to control the distribution of
copyrighted works and the limitations thereof. In some respects, many
well-established and uncontroversial state laws do just that. The Supreme Court also
recognized that rights under the Copyright Act are not shielded from state
regulation.'
A more nuanced examination of the preemption question suggests that the
California act does not undermine the goals of the federal scheme and, in particular,
the first sale doctrine.' Indeed, the main rationale for the first sale doctrine is to
reduce transaction costs in secondary markets,'o but ARR do not seem to
significantly increase transaction costs in those markets. Indeed, when one evaluates
the complex ways in which states already regulate creative markets, it is hard to see
why ARR should be singled out as unconstitutional. The scheme might or might not
be wise, but it is likely legal.
PART 1: THE DEBATE CONCERNING ARTISTS RESALE RIGHTS

The debate concerning Artists' Resale Rights (ARR) in the United States is
decades long. The focus of this Article is on state-enacted ARR, but before delving
into that complex topic this Part briefly presents the current status of the ARR debate
in the United States. Section A succinctly examines how visual artists are being
compensated and to what degree ARR can fit within that existing framework. The
rest of this Part provides a brief history of ARR, in Europe, under the federal law
system, and under state laws.

6 See Sam FrancisFound., 784 F.3d at 1323-25.

Close, 894 F.3d at 1064.
See Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387 (1941); Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123 (1932).
9 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2012).
'0 See Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568 U.S. 519, 541-43 (2013).
8
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A. Money from Art
How do creative individuals make a living? The answer is, of course, both
broad-it includes teaching, performing, servicing their employers, and much
morel-and well beyond the scope of this Article. Focusing, instead, just on those
creative individuals who sell their creative output-including book authors, music
composers, painters, sculptors, and many more-requires acknowledging certain
well-known market failures.
The most famous of those market failures has to do with public goods. 2 Creating
information goods, including creative works, commonly entails significant upfront
fixed costs, such as the costs of writing a book or sculpting a sculpture. However, in
most cases, once a work is created, producing additional copies is relatively cheap.
In other words, for those works, the average costs (which, by definition, take into
account the fixed costs) are higher than the marginal costs (i.e., the costs of producing
an additional copy)." Therefore, if the law permits copying, copiers, who do not bear
the fixed costs of creation, would be able to charge a price that is close to the marginal
costs and below average costs.14 The authors would then not be able to cover the
fixed costs of creation." Knowing that, potential authors will be disincentivized to
create and many will decide not to do it." Copyright law addresses that market
failure by making unauthorized copying illegal."
This market failure, however, occurs only if cheap copying is feasible. Many
visual artworks-such as paintings and sculptures-cannot be easily copied.
Assuming fraud and forgery-i.e., lying as to the source of a work-are illegal, then
there is no way to create a copy of a Van Gogh painting that will significantly
compete with or even affect the market for original Van Gogh paintings. As such,
for most visual artists, copyright is irrelevant." Because they sell goods that cannot
be copied, their business model is not very different from that of carpenters, car
companies, or any other seller of chattel or even real property." Like any seller,
visual artists only need property rights over the items they are creating. With those
rights, and without any intellectual property rights, they can earn a living by selling
the physical items they create.

" See, e.g., Peter DiCola, Moneyfrom Music: Survey Evidence on Musicians'Revenue andLessons

About12 Copyright Incentives, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 301, 304 (2013).
See, e.g., Guy A. Rub, Rebalancing Copyright Exhaustion, 64 EMORY L.J. 741, 763-64 (2015).
1 See Guy A. Rub, Amazon and the New World ofPublishing, 14 I/S: J.L. & POL'Y FOR INFO. SOC'Y

367, 383 (2018); Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law, 94 MICH. L. REv. 1197, 1206
(1996).
14 Sterk, supra note 13, at 1204.
" Rub, supra note 12, at 763-64.

'6 Id.
17 Id, at 764.; see 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (2012).
18 Guy A. Rub, The Unconvincing Case for Resale Royalties, 124 YALE L.J. F. 1, 4-5 (2014)
(explaining how visual artists operate under a different business model-the single copy business
model-than other creators, who instead use a multi-copies model); see Amy Adler, Why Art Does Not

Need Copyright, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 313, 319-21 (2018).
1

Rub, supra note 18, at 5 n.17.
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B. The Emergence ofArtist Resale Royalties
Visual artworks present another less-common (although not unique)
feature-uncertain future value. The future value of most cars and furniture is, to a
large degree, predictable. Artworks, at least when it comes to expensive works, are
different. While most artworks will either maintain their value or experience
reduction over time, a minority of works will dramaticallyincrease in value. In many
cases, especially when it comes to emerging artists, it is quite difficult to identify
those value-increasing works in advance. Such an increase in value, once it happens,
benefits the owner of the artwork. The owner of a work at that time might, however,
not be the artist but a dealer, a collector, or someone else. This scenario in which
non-artists gain the increase in value for an artwork is perceived by some as unfair.
This concern motivated some countries, starting with France in 1920, to provide
artists with a right to receive royalties upon the resale of their works-a right
historically called droit de suite."
Professor Monroe Price cynically described this argument:

'

.

The droit de suite evolved from .. .. a vision of the starving artist,
with his genius unappreciated, using his last pennies to purchase canvas
and pigments which he turns into a misunderstood masterpiece. The
painting is sold for a pittance, probably to buy medicine for a tubercular
wife. The purchaser is a canny investor who travels about artists' hovels
trying to pick up bargains which he will later turn into large amounts of
cash. Thirty years later the artist is still without funds and his children are
in rags; meanwhile his paintings, now the subject of a Museum of Modem
Art retrospective ... fetch small fortunes at Park-Bernet and Christie's.
2
. . The droit de suite is La bohbme . . . reduced to statutory form.
While Professor Price is by no means the only scholar to mock or at least criticize
the justifications for resale rights, 22 that rationale led to the enactment and spread of
ARR, mainly across continental Europe. 23 By 2013, more than seventy countries
4
adopted ARR.2
20 Brian L. Frye, Equitable Resale Royalties, 24 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 237, 241-46 (2017) (exploring
the history of resale royalties regimes).
21 Monroe E. Price, Government Policy andEconomic Securityfor Artists: The Case of the Droitde
Suite,22 77 YALE L.J. 1333, 1335 (1968).
see, e.g., Guy A. Rub, StrongerThan Kryptonite? InalienableProfit-SharingSchemes in Copyright
Law, 27 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 49, 80-81 (2013) ("[L]egistation based on anecdotes is problematic in itself.
... anecdotes, especially salient stories about famous and beloved artists, tend to make a phenomenon
seem significantly more common than it actually is. In fact, in those cases even the anecdotes themselves
are factually questionable, as neither the French Impressionist painters nor Mark Twain were starving
because of exploitation by greedy, shrewd buyers.").
23 Frye, supra note 20, at 244-46 (exploring the history of resale royalties regimes outside of France).

24

U.S.

COPYRIGHT

OFFICE,

RESALE

ROYALTIES:

AN

UPDATED

ANALYSIS

2

(2013),

https://www.copyright.gov/docs/resaleroyalty/usco-resaleroyalty.pdf [https://perma.cc/EB45-J6VN]; see
also CANADIAN ARTISTS REPRESENTATION LE FRONT DES ARTISTES CANADIENS, CARFAC's
SUBMISSION TO THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S STANDING COMMrIrEE ON INDUSTRY, SCIENCE AND
(2018),
ACT
COPYRIGHT
THE
OF
REVIEw
STATUTORY
THE
FOR
TECHNOLOGY
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C. Resale Royalties Under FederalLaw
Federal law in the United States has never recognized a duty to pay royalties upon
the resale of artworks. However, since the 1970s, enacting ARR has been considered
both by Congress and state legislators.25 The first federal bill-the Visual Artists'
Residual Rights Act-was introduced in 1978.26 The Bill proposed a wide reform in
the rights of visual artists, including the creation of a powerful National Commission
on the Visual Arts.27 The bill required any seller of artwork for $1,000 or more to
pay 5% royalties to the commission, to be transferred to the artist.2 8 The duty to pay
was limited to sales at a profit.2 9 The bill was referred to a committee where it died.3 o
The next two attempts, in 1986 and 1987, were also parts of broader bills that
attempted to provide visual artists rights that they then lacked." As part of those
bigger reforms those bills required sellers of visual art to pay artists 7% of the seller's
profit from any resale of artworks.3 2 The 1986 bill limited the duty to pay for sales
over $500,11 while the 1987 bill limited them to sales over $1,000.34 The bills were
eventually turned into the Visual Artist Rights Act of 1990.35 However, during the
legislative process, the resale royalty provision was removed and replaced with one
requiring the Copyright Office to "conduct a study on the feasibility of
implementing" a duty to pay resale royalties.1 6 In 1992, the Copyright Office
submitted that report. It concluded that adding ARR to U.S. law was inadvisable."
Almost twenty years later, in 2011, the fourth federal bill was introduced." It
required payment of 7% of the sale price, but only for sales at auctions over $10,000,
https://www.ourcommons.ca/Content/Committee/421/INDU/Brief/BR10093096/brexternal/CanadianArtistsRepresentation-e.pdf [https://perma.cc/4BT8-LP4Y] (noting that, as of
2018, at least ninety-three countries have adopted ARR).
25 The motivation for this movement is typically attributed to Robert Rauschenberg, one of the
greatest visual artists of the twentieth century. In 1958, Rauschenberg sold a painting, Thaw, to a dealer
for $900. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 24, at 6. In 1973, that painting was resold for $85,000. Id
In an outburst that was caught on film, Rauschenberg famously confronted the dealer complaining that
"I've been working my ass off for you to make all this profit." Id. This story is famous and it inspired (and
still inspires) attempted ARR legislation. Id. The story is also incomplete and misleading. John Henry
Merryman showed that the 1973 auction resulted in a sharp increase in the price of Rauschenberg's other
early works, many of which were still in his possession, as well as his new works, making Rauschenberg
a millionaire. John Henry Merryman, The Wrath ofRobert Rauschenberg, 41 AM. J. COMP. L. 103, 111
(1993).
2 H.R. 11403, 95th Cong. (1978).
27 id.
28
29

id.
id

30

H.R 11403,95th Cong. (as reported to HR Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Mar. 8,1978).
31 Visual Artists Rights Act of 1987, H.R. 3221, 100th Cong. (1987); Visual Artists Rights
Amendment of 1986, H.R. 5722, 99th Cong. (1986).
32 H.R. 5722; H.R. 3221.
13 H.R. 5722.
1 H.R. 3221.
3 Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 608, 104 Stat. 5089.
36 id.
3
38

U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, DROIT DE SUITE: THE ARTIST'S RESALE ROYALTY 149 (1992).

Equity for Visual Artists Act of 2011, S. 2000, 112th Cong. (2011).
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regardless of whether it is at a profit or not.39 While the bill was only referred to a
committee and never discussed further, the drafters thereof also asked the Copyright
Office to conduct an updated study.4 o In 2013, the Copyright Office published its
updated report. Now the Copyright Office took the opposite view and recommended
that a resale royalty right would be enacted.4 1
Two additional bills were submitted following that report: the American
Royalties Too Act of 201442 and the American Royalties Too Act of 2018.43 Each of
those bills required 5% royalties on all sales at an auction for over $5,000." The
45
royalties were however capped at $35,000 per work per transaction. Both bills were
46
referred to a committee and never proceeded further.
D. Resale Royalties Under State Law
Congress was not the only legislative body that considered ARR in the second
half of the 1970s. In fact, the first American bill to propose resale royalties was not
the federal Visual Artists' Residual Rights Act of 1978 but the California Resale
Royalties Act (CRRA), which was introduced in April 1975.47 This was not only the
earliest ARR bill in the country, but it is the only such bill to date to have passed into
law. 48 The CRRA provides for 5% royalties on all sales for $1,000 or more, as long
as the artist is alive and the sale is at a profit.49 The right is limited to sales "at an
auction or by a gallery, dealer, broker, museum, or other person acting as the
agent." 0 In other words, private sales are exempted. It applies if "the seller resides
in California or the sale takes place in California.""
In the years that followed the passage of the CRRA in 1976 similar bills were
introduced in other jurisdictions. We already saw that the first federal act was
introduced in 1978.52 At the state level from 1977 to 1979 no less than nine additional
states-Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and
Texas 3 -considered bills that would have added ARR in their laws. None of those
3' Id.
4 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 24, at 9.
41 Id. at 65.
42

H.R. 4103, 113th Cong. (2014).

43 H.R. 6868, 115th Cong. (2018).

4
4
4
4

H.R. 6868; H.R. 4103.
HR. 6868; H.R. 4103.
H.R. 6868; H.R. 4103.
Assemb. B. 1391, 1975 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1975).

4 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supranote 24, at 20.
49

CAL. CIV. CODE § 986(b) (West 2019).
Id. § 986(a).
s1 Id.

50

52 Infra text accompanying note 26.
53 H.File 340, 1979 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Iowa 1979); Visual Artists Proceeds Right Act, H.B.
1902,1979 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 1979); H.B. 808, 112th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 1978);
H.B. 1185, 1977 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 1977); H.B. 1004, 80th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 1977);
Residual Rights in Works of Fine Art, H.P. 963, 108th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Me. 1977); Artists' Royalties
Act, A. 8171, 1977 Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1977); H.B. 1727, 65th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1977).
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bills were enacted. In fact, to the best of my knowledge none of those bills were even
publicly discussed in a state legislator's forum.
PART II: THE VALUE OF EXPERIMENTAL

ARR DATA

Justice Brandeis famously noted that "[i]t is one of the happy incidents of the
federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a
laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of
the country." 54 Indeed, the role of state laws, as laboratories of democracy in which
different legal solutions are tried, is well recognized."
Can states serve a similar function with respect to ARR? This Article addresses
this complex question by considering three issues: First, this Part considers the value
of experimentalism in this context. The Part explores some of the main open
questions concerning ARR that experimental data may shed light on. The following
parts question whether states can effectively provide such information, and whether
the Constitution allows them to do so.
The desirability of ARR legislation is highly controversial. Proponents and
opponents of this measure do not just disagree on its overall desirability, but also on
a host of questions concerning its expected impacts. Those impacts come down to
four main questions: who will be the expected recipients of ARR, if enacted? How
will ARR affect domestic secondary markets for artworks? How will they affect
domestic primary markets? How expensive will this system be? Evaluating those
questions can shed light on the overall impact of ARR on the art world, its winners
and losers, and, of course, its overall desirability.
The value of experimental data does not stop there. ARR schemes can be set up
in different ways and those ways can affect the impacts of ARR on various
stakeholders. Therefore, exploring the effects of ARR in each jurisdiction requires
consideration of those choices as well, and how they might affect the other impacts
of this scheme. This Part addresses those choices as well.
A. The Recipients ofResale Royalties
Opponents of resale royalties often claim that the primary beneficiaries of resale
royalties are the most successful and rich artists." Naturally, most works that are
sold for a high price at auctions are created by that group. The most successful artists
who dominate auctions are also quite old or, more commonly, dead. That implies
that the recipients of resale royalties are mostly the heirs of very successful artists.
There is some historical, although inconclusive, empirical information to support

' New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
ss See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A ConstitutionofDemocratic Experimentalism, 98
COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998); Samuel Issacharoff & Catherine M. Sharkey, Backdoor Federalization,53
UCLA L. REv. 1353 (2006); Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Patent Experimentalism, 101 VA. L. REv. 65
(2015).
56 See, e.g., infra note 14.
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such a claim. In France, one 1999 report concluded that in a three-year period only
about 2,000 artists benefited from the country's resale rights scheme.17 The top fifty
of those artists received 43% of the royalties collected." The remaining 1,950 artists
received less than F450 annually on average. 9 Another report concluded "that 70%
of the royalties collected [in France] in 1996 were paid to the families of six or seven
artists."" A study in Germany found that less than five hundred artists received resale
royalties in 1998.6i Another 2000 study found that nearly 88% of those royalties were
paid to the families of deceased artists.62 A similar reality exists in Denmark where,
in 1998, 86% of the royalties were paid to artists' estates and only 14% to the artists
themselves.6 3 In the United Kingdom, a more recent study in 2008 found that since
the introduction of ARR, the top one hundred artists shared 80% of all royalties
collected.'
Recently, Professor Chris Sprigman and I argued that "the likely beneficiaries
[from ARR] will be, almost exclusively, the super-stars of the art world," and that
"top-tier artists and their heirs [will] make out like bandits under a resale royalty
scheme."'s We examined all of the sales at Sotheby's and Christie's over March and
April 2018 and concluded that if the ART Act, the latest attempt to enact ARR in the
U.S., would have been in effect, and if the market would have performed as it does
now, $2.3 million in resale royalties would have been collected just in those two
months.' Fifty-seven percent of the royalties would have been paid to deceased
artists.6 ' The Andy Warhol Foundation would have earned (before deducting
administrative costs) more than $300,000 in just those two months, which is 13% of
all the royalties collected." Andy Warhol was, of course, very wealthy in his lifetime
and his foundation is very rich as well.69 The other major receipts of royalties in the

THE

s7 Clare McAndrew & Lorna DallasConte, Inplementing Droit de Suite (Ar ists' Resale Right) in Englan
(2002),
34
ENGLAND
OF
COUNCIL
ARTS

http://www.academia.edu/7553610/Ilmplementing_DroitdeSuiteartistsresale-right_inEngland.
[https://perma.cc/DC4W-TM6X].
58 Id.

59 Id.
6 Id It is worth nothing that while both those reports suggest that ARR benefited just a small group of artists,
those results are somewhat inconsistent, with one study pointing to a much more significant concentration than the
other.
61 Id at 32.
62 id.
63

Id. at 39.

" KATY GRADDY, Noah Horowitz & Stefan Szymanski, UK INTELLETUAL PROP. OFFICE, A STUDY INTO
ThE EFFECT ON THE UK ART MARKET OF ThiE INTRODUCION OF THE ARTisr'S RESALE RIGirr 2 (2008),

https/webarchivenationalarchives.gov.uk20140603122011/http://www.ipo.gov.uk/study-doitdesuite.pdf
[https//pennacc/VU7-ZWI9].
65 Christopher Sprigman & Guy Rub, Resale Royalties Would Hurt EmergingArtists, ARTsY (Aug.
8, 2018, 5:00 PM), https://www.artsy.net/article/artsy-editorial-resale-royalties-hurt-emerging-artists
[https://perma.cc/2GUY-LQB3].
6 Id.
67 id.
68 Id.
69 Jonathan Jones, Do Rich Artists Make Bad Art?, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 27, 2006, 4:27 PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/2006/apr/27/art [https://perma.cc/RD4E-PGSJ] (noting that
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sample are similarly mostly the estates of well-known artists such as Henry Matisse,
Pablo Picasso, and Roy Lichtenstein."o
Even the 43% that would have been distributed to living artists would have been
earned mostly by famous, rich, and old artists. The biggest earner of that group would
have been the 88-year-old multimillionaire Jasper Johns.7 1 Young artists, for the
most part, do not have their work sold at major auction houses. If the ART Act were
in effect, only 2.28% of the royalties would have been paid to all artists under the
age of fifty.72 That is less than one-fifth of the royalties just to the Warhol heirs.73
Considering this data, the argument of ARR's opponent is clear: a legal scheme
that results in the transfer of wealth to those who are already very rich should be
suspected as inequitable and inefficient.74 Moreover, the massive transfer to
deceased artists' families creates additional equitable concerns. It is obviously more
difficult to base a moral or labor-based argument for a scheme that transfers wealth
to those who have not worked for it.
Proponents of ARR point to different data. Mark Waugh, for example, a Director
at the Design and Artists Copyright Society (DACS), an organization that collects
and distributes resale royalties in the U.K., noted recently that there are more than
5,000 artists in the U.K. who benefitted from resale royalties distribution since its
enactment in 2006.76 In 2017, for example, 57% of the artists receiving royalties had
artworks sold for E1,000 to C3,000.77 It is estimated that about half of them sold only
works in that price bracket, which indicates that they are likely not very
commercially-successful artists. 78
What can explain the discrepancy and how can additional data provide
information concerning the recipients of ARR? First, there are differences in the data
being reported. Sprigman and I focused on the percentage of royalties that is
channeled to the rich, successful, and typically dead artists. Waugh reported on the
percentage ofpayees that are not well-known. It is however quite possible that many
when Warhol died in 1987, he left his heirs more than $200 million); The Andy Warhol Foundation for
the Visual Arts, Inc., IRS Form 990 (2016), https://pdfguidestar.org/PDF Images/2016/133/410/2016133410749-0d760177-F.pdf [https://perma.ccYY2J-Z2PZ] (stating that in their 2017 public filings The
Andy Warhol Foundation noted that it owns assets worth more than $350 million).
o Sprigman & Rub, supranote 65.
71

id

7 Id.
73 Id

74 See, e.g., infra note 114. But see Justin Hughes & Robert P. Merges, Copyright and Distributive
Justice, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 513, 571-73 (2016) (discussing ARR and the opposition of the big
auction houses thereto (in the context of distributive rights within copyright law) and concluding that
"such opposition shows that droit de suite is a true redistributive tool, albeit only in a narrow range of
activity," while not addressing the theoretical claims or the empirical evidence concerning the
beneficiaries of ARR).
7
What is DACS?, DESIGN AND ARTISTS COPYRIGHT SOCIETY, https://www.dacs.org.uk/aboutus/what-is-dacs [https://perma.cc/3WES-WEN2].
76 Mark Waugh, We Owe Artists the CrucialIncome Resale Royalties Provide, ARTSY (Aug. 8, 2018,
5:15
PM),
https://www.artsy.net/article/artsy-editorial-owe-artists-crucial-income-resale-royaltiesprovide [https://perma.cc/A6XH-VV9V].

78 id.
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of the emerging artists in Waugh's dataset received modest amounts compared to the
well-known artist in that population.
More importantly, some of the differences in results can be attributed to the
differences in the ARR schemes being examined. Sprigman and I based our findings
on the ART Act's scheme, while Waugh's data came from the U.K. Several features
within the American bill make it less equitable than the British one. First, and
foremost, the initial threshold after which royalties are owed is only E1,000 in the
U.K., but it is more than four times higher-$5,000--under the ART Act." The
lower threshold in the U.K. allows many less known artists to receive tiny royalties
checks."o Another equality enhancing tool in the U.K. scheme is progressive royalties
brackets with a low maximum payment of C12,500.' The American scheme, in
82
comparison, includes a flat rate of 5% with a much higher maximum-$35,000.
That higher cap allows the most successful artist to receive relatively higher royalties
under the ART Act.
It might be tempting to suggest that an easy way to mitigate the regressive
distributions problem under the ART Act is to adopt the British scheme. It is not that
simple. While the British scheme with its low threshold will create a more equitable
distribution, doing so will increase the royalties' base and will likely entail a dramatic
increase in transaction costs, a topic that will be discussed below.13 In addition,
lowering the maximum cap for royalties per work, which can further improve
equitable distribution, will be resisted by many ARR opponents, as they perceive
them as a basic human right that should not be capped."
This discussion illustrates some issues for which more experimental data can
assist decision makers in concluding whether ARR are desirable, and, if so, how such
a scheme is to be constructed. The current data on this topic is partial. For example,
one of the issues in the data that Sprigman and I collected is that it is based on
observations of the current state of secondary art markets in the United States. 5 But,
as further discussed below, the art world might change in reaction to the enactment
of ARR. One can question how those changes will affect the inequitable distribution
that we documented.

79

art

CompareH.R 6868,115th Cong. § 3 (2018), with The Artist's Resale Right Regulations 2006, SI 2006/346,
http://www.legislation.gov.ukAiksi/2006f346/pdfs/uksi 20060346 en.pdf
(Eng.),
1 3(b)
12,

[httpsJ/permace/TXJ-NUBZ] (hereinafter ARR Regulations). Another important distinction is that the U.K. act

applies to resales by all professionals including, for example, small galleries, while the American bill applies only to
sales by large auction houses. This is why focusing on Sotheby's and Christie's, as Sprigman and I did, supranote
65, makes sense in the American context.
s ARR Regulations, supra note 79, at Schedule 1. In the U.K. the royalties for a work sold at an

auction for E1,000 is C40. Id.
81 Id The highest rate, which requires a 4% royalty, is available just to works sold for up to E50,000. Id The
royalties for the next C150,000 in sale price are 3%. Id After that, the rate of royalties falls fast 1% for the next

E150,000; 0.5% for the next E150,000; and only 025% for any payment above 6500,000. Id
82 H.R. 6868, 115th Cong. § 3 (2018).
See infra Section H.D.
84 See, e.g., Donn Zaretsky, Resale Royalty Update, ART L. BLOG (July 19, 2014, 12:54 PM),
83

http://theartlawblog.blogspot.com/2014/07/resale-royalty-update.html [https://perma.cc/JH4E-6LYF].
81 Sprigman & Rub, supra note 65.
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B. Effects on the SecondaryMarketfor Artworks
Opponents of ARR suggest that it will likely negatively affect the secondary
markets for artworks.1 6 The duty to pay royalties will discourage buyers and cause
some of them to engage in sales in other jurisdictions that do not impose ARR. This
risk seems real: First, in many cases, changing the location of a sale from one
jurisdiction to another is easy to do; second, the international art world is highly
competitive-while the market in the United States is the largest in the world, the
markets in China and the United Kingdom are close in their size and infrastructure
to the American one."
Indeed, the United States is not the only country in the world that rejects resale
royalties. While resale royalties were adopted by more countries in recent
decades-a fact that proponents of ARR stress-most of those countries have tiny
market shares. Two of the three largest markets-those in the United States and
China-are not subject to ARR. And even in the third-that is the United
Kingdom-ARR were enacted relatively recently." While most Western European
countries adopted ARR during the twentieth century, the U.K. did not. Then, in 2001,
the European Union adopted a directive that forced all member countries to adopt
ARR no later than 2006.89 Britain fought against the directive but eventually,
reluctantly, complied.' It passed ARR regulations in 2006.1' It, however, used an
exception within European directive that allowed "concerned" countries "a limited
transitional period during which they may choose not to apply the resale right for the
benefit of those entitled under the artist after his death"9 2 and decided that, until 2012,
ARR would not apply after the death of the artist.93 Considering that ARR impacts
dead artists more than living artists, the U.K. experience is very young. And it might
not last for much longer. In 2019, Britain is set to leave the European Union and not
8 See, e.g., U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 24, at 51-52; McAndrew & Dallas-Conte, supra
note 57, at 20-21, Sprigman & Rub, supra note 65.
" Jodlle Farchy & Kathryn Graddy, The Implications of the Artist's Resale Right, Standing Committee of

Copyright and Related Rights, at 4, World Intell. Prop. Org. [WIPO], Thirty-Fifth Session, SCCR/35i7 (Nov. 6,
2017), https //www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/copyright/en/sccr_35/secr 35 7.pdf[https.//pernaceN8DD-HWGJ].
8' Those three largest markets control the vast majority (close to 80%) of contemporary art auction
sales worldwide. Id. The fourth largest market, that of France, is about nine times smaller than the third
largest (China) and fourteen times smaller than the American market. Id. The fifth largest market, that of
Germany, is less than half the size of the France one. Id. The other markets in the world are much smaller.
Id.; see also infra note 124.
" Directive 2001/84, ofthe European Parliament and of the Council of 27 September 2001 on the Resale Right
for the Benefit of the Author of an Original Work of Art, 2001 OJ. (L 272) 32, 32 (stating that in the European
Union "the resale tight is an unassignable and inalienable right, enjoyed by the author).
9 See, e.g., PHILIP WARD & GRAHAME DANBY, HOUSE OF COMMONS HOME AFFAIRS SELECT
COMMITTEE, PARLIAMENT OF THE U. K., SN/HA/4781, ARTIST'S RESALE RIGHT 2-4 (2010),
http://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/SN04781/SNO4781.pdf;
Christina
Fleming,
Artists' Resale Rights-Brexit's Positive Impact?, CHARLES RUSSELL SPEECHLYS: INSIGHTS (Feb. 10,
2017), https://www.charlesrussellspeechlys.com/en/news-and-insights/insights/commercial/2017/artistsresale-rights---brexits-positive-impact [https://perma.cc/SG9E-NFN8].
9 ARR Regulations, supranote 79.
92 Directive 2001/84, supranote 89, at
33.
" Farchy & Graddy, supra note 87, at 20.

664

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 107

be subject to its directives.94 It is possible that following Brexit, the U.K. will abolish
ARR, as some commentators urge it to do." Considering that reality, implementing
ARR in the United States, while ARR are not required in China and might soon be
abolished in the U.K., could harm the American secondary market.96 That market
does not just support the nation's artists, especially as many participants in this
market, such as galleries, also invest in the primary market, but it also supports
related sectors that provide complementary services to the secondary market.
Proponents of ARR often call for the global adoption of ARR1 but, in the
meanwhile, they question whether secondary markets are really significantly
harmed.98 U.S. buyers, the argument goes, will rarely bother to sell works in China
and therefore the impact will be marginal.Y Mark Waugh, for example, recently
commented on the U.K. experience by noting: "Has the secondary market collapsed,
or is it depressed? We monitor sales, so we know the answer to that! London is still
flourishing, with international galleries joining homegrown dealers to service a
global and growing group of collectors." 100
It is quite difficult to evaluate the impact of existing ARR schemes on the size of
secondary art markets. First, many factors affect those markets, and isolating the
impact of ARR is challenging and requires significant data. The British art market,
for example, experienced significant instability in recent years, and its overall size
has shrunk. But, considering many other possibly-relevant developments in recent
years-for example, the economic crisis of 2008, the sluggish recovery, the increase
in digital distribution, the rise of populist leaders around the world, and the Brexit
vote and its aftermath-it is difficult to know what the impact of ARR on the

9 NIGEL WALKER, HOUSE OF COMMONS, PARLIAMENT OF THE U. K., 7960, BRExrr TIMELINE:
EVENTS LEADING TO THE UK'S ExIT FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION 3 (May 23, 2019),
https://researchbriefings.parliamentuk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/CBP-7960#fullreport

[https://perma.ccN53F-YRPL].
" Compare Fleming, supra note 90 with Clare McAndrew, Why Brexit is a Golden Opportunityfor
the UK. Art Market, ARTSY (Aug. 30, 2018, 4:01 PM), https://www.artsy.net/article/artsy-editorialbrexit-golden-opportunity-uk-art-market [https://perma.cc/52AL-7LKU]. It should be noted that ARR
was not addressed in the draft agreement that was reached between the British government and the
European Union, but in related non-binding understandings the parties noted that resale rights should
continue to be protected. See PoliticalDeclarationSetting Out the Frameworkforthe FutureRelationship

Between the European Unionand the UnitedKingdom, at 145, XT (2018) 21095, annex, (Nov. 22, 2018),
https://www.consilium.europaeulmedia/37059/20181121-cover-political-declaration.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YSW4-ESEW]. The British parliament, however, later rejected the draft agreement, and,
implicitly, the non-binding declaration. WALKER, supra note 94, at 40. At the time of writing, the fate of
Brexit, including whether Britain will maintain its ARR scheme if and when it leaves the European Union,
is unclear.
* Sprigman & Rub, supra note 65.
* Some of those proponents even started a website to pmmote that goal. RESALE RIGHT-ARTISTS AUL OVER
THE WORLD, http-//www.resale-rightorg [httpsJ/permacc/ZWF6-V9K9]; see also SAM RICKETSON, PROPOSED
INTERNATIONAL TREATY ON DROIT DE SurrE/RESALE ROYALTY RIGHT FOR VISUAL ARTISTS (2015),

http/www.cisac.org/content/download/3393/42701/file/SG15-0565Ricketson
06 EN.pdf[httpsi//penna.ce/NNA4-XB5X].

Study-Definitive_2015-07-

' See, e.g., McAndrew & Dallas-Conte, supra note 57, at 21, 22 n. 12; Waugh, supra note 76.
9 See generallyU.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 24, at 51-52, 57-58.
" Waugh, supranote 76.
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downsizing of the U.K. secondary markets is.' 0
Second, many countries adopted ARR decades ago and many countries that
adopted it, recently or not, have a small market share.1 02 Third, it is not enough to
adopt ARR-it also needs to be enforced. Some data from various jurisdictions,
including California, suggests that ARR are not well enforced which naturally makes
their effect in those jurisdictions negligble.' 03 Fourth, in some jurisdictions, the rate
of royalties is much lower than the one proposed in the United States, which
proportionally shrinks the impact of ARR. In the U.K., for example, the rate of
royalties is just 0.5% for sales over E350,000 and 0.25% for sales over E500,000.I I
Naturally, with such small rates the impact of resale royalties is quite small and hard
to detect.'os
The existing data on the effect of resale royalties on secondary markets is lacking
and, at times, anecdotal. For example, some have claimed that in the 1960s "the [art]
market moved from Paris to the U.S. and U.K." partly because of "a complicated
system of taxes and royalties on art sales that drove both buyers and sellers away
from France and towards more liberal trading regimes."10 Relatedly, recently, a
group of leaders in the French art market published an open letter to their President,
Emmanuel Macron, warning him, among others, that if the United Kingdom cease
to require ARR payments post-Brexit it might "weaken the French position in a
competitive art market economy."' 0 7
In California, shortly after the passage of the CRRA, Sotheby's decided to cease
holding contemporary art auctions in Los Angeles, which arguably harmed
California's art market.' 0 However, to the best of my knowledge, there is only one
study concerning the impact of the CRRA on California's art market and it concluded
that the CRRA shrank it, especially by harming small galleries.' 09 However,
considering that the CRRA was rarely enforced, it is unlikely that the impact was
10"

102

See infra note 112 and accompanying text.
See supra note 88. See also The ContemporaryArt Market Report: Renewed Growth, ART PRICE.

(2017),
https://www.artprice.com/artprice-reports/the-contemporary-art-market-report-2017/renewedgrowth [https://perma.cc/9CN8-G45C].
103 Anna J. Mitran, Royalties Too?: ExploringResale Royaltiesfor New Media Art, 101 CORNELL L.
REV. 1349, 1370 (2016) ("The California Act is often criticized for poor enforcement, and even France,
with a large infrastructure of collecting organizations . . . in place, cannot always collect royalties from
non-auction sales.").
04 ARR Regulations, supra note 79.
'os In the first twelve years in which ARR have existed in the U.K. (2006-2018), including six in
which they have applied to dead and living artists, ARR have generated a mere sixty-five million pounds
in royalties. Waugh, supra note 76. In 2014 the effective royalty rate on post-war contemporary and
modern art was only 0.64%. Id. In comparison, the data that Sprigman and I collected, supra note 65,
suggests that just two large auction houses in the U.S. would have generated about $1.2 million a month
in royalties, with an effective royalty rate in those two organizations of over 4%.
McAndrew, supra note 95.
07 Alex Capon, French trade bodies call on President Macron to stop UK art market gaining an advantage from
Brexit, ANTiQUES TRADE GAZETTE (Feb. 8, 2019), https://www.antiquestradegazette.com/news/2019/fiench-trade1"

bodies-call-on-president-macron-to-stop-uk-art-market-gaining-an-advantage-from-brexit
108 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 24, at 22.

' 9 See Tom R. Camp, Art Resale Rights and the Art Resale Market: An EmpiricalStudy, 28 BULL.
COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 146,149 (1980).
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significant.
The data from the United Kingdom is similarly lacking and inconclusive. Early
studies-one that was published in January 2008 and another one that was published
in 2011, both based on data up to 2007-did not find evidence that ARR diverted
business away from the U.K. art market."o However, those studies include less than
two years' worth of data since the implementation of ARR, and during a time in
which ARR applied only to living artists."' Recent anecdotal data is inconclusive,
with opponents and proponents of ARR citing partial data to show that ARR
damaged or did not damage the U.K. secondary markets." 2
C. Effects on the PrimaryMarketsfor Artworks
Possibly the most controversial claim that the opponents of ARR make is that
they are likely to reduce prices in the primary market for artworks. The argument is
simple yet powerful. One of the factors that buyers take into account in making
rational purchasing decisions is the value of the items purchased in resale markets.
Reducing their potential profits, as ARR do, will therefore reduce their willingness
to pay, and therefore will lower prices in the primary market." 3 The argument is
powerful because the primary market for artworks is the bloodline of the vast
majority of artists, including young and emerging artists. Therefore, if the argument
is correct, ARR reduce the income of all artists just to compensate the most
successful and rich artists. This is why ARR is sometimes described by their
opponents as a regressive tax system-one that transfers wealth from the artist
population in general to the richest subset thereof." 4
110 GRADDY ET AL., supra note 64; Chanont Banternghansa & Kathryn Graddy, The Impact of the
Droit de Suite in the UK: An EmpiricalAnalysis, 35 J. CULT. EcON. 81, 97-98 (2011).
.n Relying on such a short period, while valuable, is necessarily lacking because it is difficult to
isolate other factors that contribute to the size of the market in that period. The authors of those studies
discuss some of those limitations. See Banternghansa & Graddy, supra note 110, at 98.
112 Compare, for example, Fleming, supranote 90 ("Post War & Contemporary art sales in the UK... are now
37% lower than their peak in 2008. Within the Post War & Contemporary art sector, sales of work of living artists
at auction reached $434 million in 2016, representing a decline of 41% year-on-year against a global decline ofjust
7."), with Abby Yolda, Brexit andArtists' Copyright: Making the Caefor ContinuedProtectionof Creatom'
Rights, A-N (Mar. 13, 2017), https.//www.a-n.co.uk/news/brexit-artists-copyright-making-case-continuedprotection-creators-rights [https//permacc/PZR8-CP5C] ("[With the UK art market the second largest in the world
and valued higher in 2015 than when ARR was first introduced in 2006 (even with recovering from the global
recession), the argument that ARR has had a negative impact on the UK art trade is unfounded."). See also DIGITAL,
CULmIRE, MEDIA, AND SPORT COMMITIEE, THE PoTEFI3AL IMPACT OF BREXIT ON THE CREATIVE INDUSIRIES,
H.C.,
at
170
72
(U.K.),
DIGITAL
SINGLE
MARKET,
TOURISM
AND
THE

[httpsJ/permaccl4SAThttps//publications.pardiamentuk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmcumeds/365/36507.htm
4YCR] (reporting on conflicting claims concerning the impact of ARR on the British secondary markets).
113 See Rub, supra note 22, at 108.
114 Sprigman & Rub, supra note 65 ("This reverse-Robin Hood story is not some bug in the
system-it is its main feature.. .. Resale royalties schemes are a regressive tax: they take from the poor
and give to the rich."); see also Frye, supra note 20, at 241 ("Opponents argue that the resale royalty right
is both inequitable and inefficient, because it benefits successful artists at the expense of unsuccessful
artists by lowering prices on the primary market. . . ."); Rub, supra note 18, at 7 ("[R]esale royalties
... transfer income from younger to older and more successful artists.").
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Proponents of ARR reject this claim by making several possible
counter-arguments: first, many buyers of fine art do not buy it as an investment but
solely because they appreciate the work, want to hold it, or only enjoy it
aesthetically."' For those buyers, the potential profits from resale are mostly
irrelevant. Second, even those who buy as an investment (or partly as an investment)
will, in many cases, just absorb the additional costs of resale royalties and will not
pass them to the artists from whom they buy art. Moreover, those buyers might
discount the royalties in their purchasing decision. Rationally, the argument goes,
bringing expected future resale royalty payments to present day values make the low
royalties almost negligible. Moreover, buyers, like all humans, suffer from bounded
rationality. As such, ARR, which are expected in the far future, are unlikely to affect
potential buyers negatively. Finally, many buyers arguably would be happy to know
that their actions support artists.
One can see that those counter-arguments cannot rule out that some buyers will
take ARR into account in making their purchasing decisions, but it is unclear how
big that group is. If it is small in size, the harm to the primary market might be
minimal and hardly observable. Of course, the existence of a price decrease in the
primary market and its magnitude are affected by other factors such as the royalty
rate and their de facto enforceability. A low royalty rate, like that in the U.K., might
make the impact on ARR so small that it will not be easily observable.
There is only scarce data concerning the impact of ARR on primary markets."
As with secondary markets, it is quite difficult to isolate the effects of ARR on any
market and separate it from other factors that can affect it."' In addition, and
probably more importantly, primary art markets are drenched in secrecy."'8 Unlike
the big auction houses, artists and their gallerists do not publish the prices paid in the
primary market.' ' As such, it is almost impossible to conduct a systematic study on
the impact on primary art markets. This problem might not be resolvable even if
more jurisdictions adopt ARR.
D. The Administrative Costs ofARR
Opponents of ARR claim that they are very expensive to administer. I explained
this issue elsewhere:
[R]esale royalties do not just transfer income from younger to older and
"

Michael B. Reddy, The Droit de Suite: Why American Fine Artists Should Have the Right to a

Resale Royalty, 15 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 509, 529 (1995).
" One study from the United Kingdom, GRADDY ET AL., supra note 64, at 2, did suggest to have that
information and it concluded that no impact on primary markets was observed. There are multiple issues
with this study, including that it was published in January 2008, only two years after ARR were
implemented and when they applied only to living artists.
"1 See supra Section II.B.
"1 See Banternghansa & Graddy, supra note 110, at 83-84.
11 Anna Louie Sussman, The StrategiesArt DealersUse to DiscountArtists' Work, ARTSY (Aug. 20,
2018, 5:19 PM), https://www.artsy.net/article/artsy-editorial-strategies-art-dealers-discount-artists-work.

[https://perma.cc/WYE4-UEL5].
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more successful artists. They also waste resources along the way because
of the significant transaction costs of running the resale royalty rights
system. These costs include, among other things, costs of locating the
12 0
authors and their heirs, costs of monitoring, and costs of litigation.
ARR schemes differ in their handling of those administrative costs. Some
systems, such as the British one and the one envisioned by the ART Act, expect large
private artists' rights organizations to administer the collection and distribution of
royalties in return for a share thereof.121 Other systems, such as the one created by
the CRRA, require a public agency, such as the California Arts Council, to provide
that function.1 22 Both systems are wasteful. Every dollar that is spent on the
administration of the ARR is a dollar that could have been spent on a more productive
use, whether in support of the arts or not. Nevertheless, it is unclear which of those
schemes involve higher administrative costs.
Other features of each ARR scheme can significantly impact the administrative
costs. Those costs are likely correlated to the number of transactions that are subject
to royalty payments. This is why every existing or envisioned ARR scheme includes
23
a threshold for low-value works that do not trigger resale rights.1 Keeping that
threshold low might seem fairer as it allows more artists to be paid but it also
increases the number of transactions and wastes significant administrative costs.
Indeed, it is probably inefficient to ask an agency to chase an artist just to give her a
tiny royalty check.
Another design feature that can affect administrative costs is the type of sales that
are subject to resale rights. If ARR are limited to sales at large public auctions, as the
ART Act suggests, then their economy of scale will likely allow those auction houses
and the organizations that distribute the royalties to relatively effectively manage
them. Expanding ARR to smaller galleries or individual sellers, as is the case with
the CRRA, will increase those costs and can significantly burden those small sellers.
While those arguments are likely correct in theory, there is little data concerning
the actual costs to the collecting organization and practically no data as to the costs
for sellers and their agents.
PART 1II: CAN STATES EFFECTIVELY EXPERIMENT WITH ARR?

The previous Part showed that ARR are controversial, that proponents and
opponents thereof make conflicting claims regarding their impact, and that the
available experimental data that could help decision-makers explore those questions
is scarce. This Part considers whether states can effectively fill that gap. The next
Part considers whether they are allowed to do so.
On the one hand, states can generally provide experimental information by
enacting different legal rules, enforcing those rules, and examining the impacts
thereof. The existence of more than fifty different legal systems within the United
120 Rub, supra note 18, at 7.
121
122
123

See H. R. 6868, 115th Cong. § 3 (2018); ARR Regulations, supra note 79, at art. 14,¶ 1.
E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 986(a) (West 2019).
See, e.g., supra note 79 and accompanying text.
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States can provide rich data. In theory this can be done in the context of ARR as well,
especially because there are many possible schemes for ARR legislation, as was
discussed in Part II. In practice, however, while state experimentalism isn't
worthless, there are significant limits to state-enacted ARR and their empirical value.
First, while there are more than fifty legal systems in the United States, many
states do not have a large, well-developed secondary art market. The New York
resale art market is likely bigger than all the other markets in the country combined,
especially when it comes to large public auction houses.1 24 Indeed, some states have
tiny markets that might not be able to generate meaningful ARR data, and the
significant variation in market sizes will undermine the comparative value of the data
generated.
Second, ARR schemes can be circumvented, especially when they are enacted
by smaller states, where sales can easily be completed over state lines. Let's assume
that Rhode Island enacts ARR but its neighboring states, Connecticut and
Massachusetts, do not. Examining the art market in Rhode Island following such a
reform might provide misleading information. For example, it is possible that the
impact of Rhode Island's ARR on its primary prices, even if observable, will be
minimal because the state's largest city, Providence, is an hour away from both
Connecticut's and Massachusetts's largest cities (Hartford and Boston), which will
allow Rhode Island's sellers to easily circumvent the ARR scheme.1 25
One way in which states can make their ARR more effective is by enforcing them
on out-of-state transactions. California's ARR, for example, applies to sales in
California and sales by California residents, regardless of the location of the sale.1 26
A similar provision was included in all the bills that states considered in the late
1970s.1 27 There are, however, several issues with such legal mechanisms. First, they
can still be circumvented. For example, a California seller can transfer the work to a
Delaware corporation which will then sell it in Nevada. States will need to develop
sophisticated legal tests to identify and prevent such moves, which might not be
trivial. Second, those mechanisms will harm, possibly significantly, the value of the
experimental data produced. Once states enforce their ARR scheme on sales in other
states, attributing a perceived phenomenon (e.g., a price decrease in a primary market
in a certain state) to a specific state's legislation becomes more challenging. Third,
as further discussed in Part IV, enforcing ARR on out-of-state transactions might put
the constitutionality of such bills in doubt.
As further discussed in Part IV, the constitutionality of those long-arm acts is
especially questionable when state-enacted ARR schemes place liability on
124 In 2017, 43% of the worldwide auction revenue from contemporary art, which is the main market

for ARR, was concentrated in New York. The ContemporaryArt Market Report: Renewed Growth, supra
note 102. London, Hong Kong, and Beijing accounted, together, for an additional 40%. Id. The 540 cities
worldwide that had fine art auction markets in 2017, accounted, together, for just 17% of that market. Id.
125 This discussion assumes that the work itself needs to move in order to have the sale in another
state. This might not be the case, which will make circumvention even easier. The question of how to
determine the location of a sale transaction is beyond the scope of this work.
126 CAL. CIV. CODE § 986(a) (West 2019).
121 See supra Section I.D.
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out-of-state agents of their residents-i.e., the large auction houses. Consequently,
states that would like to enact effective ARR have a difficult choice to make: should
liability be placed on out-of-state auction houses for selling artworks of their
residents outside the state? If the answer is no, circumventing ARR becomes easier
because it is difficult to effectively enforce ARR against the sellers themselves,
partly because the auction houses do not publish the identity of sellers (or buyers).128
If the answer is yes, the connection between the states and the auction house might
be too remote to make the ARR legal. When California considered its ARR
legislation it struggled with this choice and eventually chose to enact a broader law
that applied to out-of-state agents, knowing that it might undermine the CRRA's
constitutionality.12 9 As expected, the CRRA was challenged on those grounds. To
those challenges, this Article now turns.
PART IV: THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATE-ENACTED

ARR

The constitutionality of state-enacted ARR can be challenged on three main
grounds. First, such a scheme, when it applies to out-of-state transactions, may
violate the dormant Commerce Clause. Second, an ARR scheme, whether it applies
to out-of-state transactions or not, may be preempted by the federal Copyright Act.
Third, ARR schemes, if applied to works that were previously purchased, might
violate the Fifth Amendment's prohibition on taking without compensation, as it
applies to the states. 3 o
California's Resale Royalties Act (CRRA) was subject to all those challenges,
which, once fully litigated, left it as a de facto dead letter. The Ninth Circuit
addressed the constitutionality of the CRRA in three opinions. In the
first-Morseburgv. Balyo the Ninth Circuit held, in 1980, that the CRRA was
not preempted by the Copyright Act of 1909.131 The Copyright Act of 1909 did not
include an express preemption provision and therefore the court applied the general
principles of field preemption and conflict preemption and concluded that CRRA
128 See Jenack v. Rabizadeh, 22 NY 3d 470 (2013) (holding that auctioneers do not require to disclose
the name of the sellers after stating that "Jenack and amici argue that ... it is a time honored and necessary
custom and practice of auction houses to maintain the confidentiality of the seller."). See also Tom
Mashberg, Lawyers Fight to Keep Auction Sellers Anonymous, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 3, 2013),
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/04/arts/design/battling-to-keep-auction-sellers-anonymous.html
[https://perma.cc/624D-KJ8U].
129 See CAL. CIV. CODE § 986(a) (West 2019).
130 This Part focuses on the first two grounds. For several reasons, the third is of less concern and thus
falls outside the scope of this Article. First, the Taking Clause argument has nothing to do with the
federalism questions that are the focus of this Article. If Congress ever decides to enact ARR it will face
a similar question. Second, to the best of my knowledge, the Taking Clause claim was never fully litigated.
Third, the Taking Clause problem can easily be avoided, by applying ARR prospectively and not
retroactively. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 24, at 60-63 ("[I]n the interests of avoiding
constitutional doubt and of minimizing the federal government's exposure to unnecessary litigation, we
recommend that Congress strongly consider making any resale royalty legislation prospective in
application."). As such, the Taking Clause arguement does not go to the heart of the ARR scheme itself.
See also infra note 138.
131 Morseburg v. Balyon, 621 F.2d 972, 975-78 (9th Cir. 1980).
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survives both.13 2 That decision had a limited effect because the Copyright Act of
1909 was replaced by the Copyright Act of 1976, which became effective in 1978,
one year after the effective date of CRRA."I
It took thirty-five years until the Ninth Circuit addressed the CRRA again. In that
timeframe the resale rights were seldom enforced.' 34 Then, in 2011, a group of artists
and heirs filed class action complaints against the two largest auction houses in the
country-Sotheby's and Christie's-as well as eBay, for failing to comply with the
CRRA.' 5 That dispute reached the Ninth Circuit twice. First, in Sam Francis
Foundation v. Christies, Inc. in 2015, the Ninth Circuit decided en banc, over a
partial dissent by three judges, that the CRRA, as far as it applies to out-of-state sales,
violates the dormant Commerce Clause.' 6 In 2018, in Close v. Sotheby's, the court
decided that the surviving parts of the CRRA are expressly preempted by the
Copyright Act of 1976, which means that it cannot apply to any resales after January
1, 1978, the federal act's effective day. 3 7 Collectively, those decisions mean that the
CRRA applies, at most, solely to artworks that were resold in California in 1977.138
This Part critically analyzes those decisions and the issues they raised and
suggests that certain state-enacted ARR should survive constitutional scrutiny, and
that certain features within an ARR scheme, some of which are lacking in the CRRA,
may help it do so.
A. State ARR and Out-of-State Sales: The Dormant Commerce Clause
The first challenge to state-enacted ARR is rooted in the dormant Commerce
Clause. While the Commerce Clause grants Congress power to "regulate Commerce
... among the several States,"' 39 the Supreme Court has "consistently held this
language to contain a further, negative command, known as the dormant Commerce
Clause," which prevents states from enacting certain measures that harm interstate
commerce.1 4 o The goals of the dormant Commerce Clause track those of the
Commerce Clause itself: "the conviction that in order to succeed, the new Union

Id. at 976-78.
See id. at 975.
134 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 24, at 22-23; see also Patricia Cohen, Artists File Lawsuits,
Seeking Royalties, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/02/arts/design/artistsfile-suit-against-sothebys-christies-and-ebay.html [https://perma.cc/GH74-EJQF] (reporting that since
the CRRA's enactment, about four hundred artists had received a total of $328,000).
13s Sam Francis Found. v. Christies, Inc., 784 F.3d 1320, 1322 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc).
131 Id., at 1324-25.
1' Close v. Sotheby's, 894 F.3d 1061, 1072 (9th Cir. 2018).
138 Two additional obstacles stand in the way of potential CRRA plaintiffs. First, claims under the
CRRA can be brought only "within three years after the date of sale or one year after the discovery of the
sale, whichever is longer." CAL. CIV. CODE § 986(a)(3) (West 2019). Second, in dictum, the Ninth Circuit
suggested that requiring an individual who purchased artwork before the enactment of the CRRA (1976)
and resold it in 1977 to pay resale royalties might violate the Takings Clause. Close, 894 F.3d at 1075.
See also infra note 130.
139 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
'" Comptroller of Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1794 (2015).
132

"
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would have to avoid the tendencies toward economic Balkanization that had plagued
relations among the Colonies and later among the States under the Articles of
Confederation."l41

In Sam Francis,the Ninth Circuit held that under the dormant Commerce Clause,
California could not require resale royalties in connection with out-of-state
transactions.' 42 In reaching that conclusion, the Ninth Circuit relied exclusively on
the unusual extraterritoriality doctrine as expressed by a 1989 Supreme Court
decision-Healy v. Beer Institute-that stated four conditions "concerning the
extraterritorial effects of state economic regulation." 43 The first of those conditions
is that the "[dormant] Commerce Clause .

.

. precludes the application of a state

statute to commerce that takes place wholly outside of the State's borders."'" The
Ninth Circuit held that the CRRA fails that condition.' 45
Applying Healy to the CRRA, in the way that the Ninth Circuit did, is, however,
over-simplistic and problematic. Healy, like many of the cases that the Supreme
Court built upon in that decision, dealt with significant limitations on transactions
that took place in other jurisdictions. In Healy, the Court struck down a Connecticut
law that required beer sellers to sell beer in Connecticut at a price that was equal to
or lower than that of neighboring states.1 46 One of the stated motivations of that law
was to discourage interstate commerce, as Connecticut was worried that its residents
would circumvent the state sale tax by buying beer across state lines. 47 The Healy
rule, however, needs to be applied carefully in other contexts. Indeed, as Jack
Goldsmith and Alan Sykes noted, courts cannot literally apply the Healy rule and
strike down every state law that regulated any out-of-state activity.1 48 The CRRA
seems significantly less restrictive than the law the Court considered in Healy, and
therefore courts should be hesitant to strike it down simply because it affects
out-of-state conduct.
The Ninth Circuit's simplistic reliance on Healy also ignores the development in
the law since the late 1980s. As Brannon Denning noted, Healy "represented
extraterritoriality's high tide." 49 However, "[t]he Court has since retreated; in 2003
[in Pharm. Research & Mfrs. Ass'n v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644 (2003)], it seemed to
limit the extraterritoriality principle dramatically" and therefore "[a]t this point, the
extraterritoriality principle looks to be quite moribund."' The First Circuit similarly

Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325 (1979).
Sam Francis Found. v. Christies, Inc., 784 F.3d 1320, 1323 (9th Cir. 2015).
In Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336-37 (1989).
'"Id. at 336 (quotations omitted).
145 Sam FrancisFound., 784 F.3d at 1323.
'" Healy, 491 U.S. at 326, 343.
141 Id. at 326-27.
'" See Jack L. Goldsmith & Alan 0. Sykes, The Internet and the DormantCommerce Clause, 110
YALE L.J. 785, 790 (2001) ("[The Healy] formulation is clearly too broad. Scores of state laws validly
apply to and regulate extrastate commercial conduct that produces harmful local effects.").
'4 Brannon P. Denning, Extraterritorialityand the Dormant Commerce Clause: A Doctrinal
Post-Mortem, 73 LA. L. REV. 979, 979 (2013).
"s0 Id. at 979.
141

142
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called the doctrine "the dormant branch of the dormant Commerce Clause."1 5 1 The
Sixth Circuit was even harsher in suggesting that "the extraterritoriality doctrine, at
least as a freestanding branch of the dormant Commerce Clause, is a relic of the old
world with no useful role to play in the new."l52
Indeed, the Ninth Circuit's succinct application of the extraterritoriality doctrine
seems misguided. Once that crude approach is abandoned, the CRRA, as a state law
that affects out-of-state behavior, should be subject to the common dormant
Commerce Clause tests that evaluate whether it is discriminatory against inter-state
commerce and whether it survives a balancing test.
Enforcing the CRRA is not inconsistent with the Supreme Court caselaw. The
Court recognizes that states can regulate streams ofincome earned by their residents,
even if originating out-of-state. The main example of such permissible actions is the
imposition of state tax on the out-of-state income. Courts repeatedly recognize that,
subject to certain limitations, further discussed below, states are permitted to create
such a taxing scheme."' The Constitution allows a state to tax that income even
though it likely indirectly affects the trade in another state.
In Sam Francis,the Ninth Circuit rejected this claim because resale royalties are
not taxes.' 54 Indeed, they are not. Taxes are paid to the state while resale royalties
are paid to the artists or their heirs. But that, in itself, should not be the end of the
analysis. While courts sometimes use differently worded tests in the context of tax
and non-tax dormant Commerce Clause cases, there should not be a fundamental
difference in the scope of the doctrine in those contexts. In both contexts the doctrine
is rooted in the same constitutional provision and promotes the same goals."'
The real question is therefore not whether resale royalties are taxes but what are
the differences and similarities between the two, from a dormant Commerce Clause
perspective, that would justify separate or similar treatment. The Supreme Court's
recent dormant Commerce Clause caselaw emphasizes that the inquiry is
non-formalistic and should instead apply "a more practical approach that look[s] to
the economic impact of' state law.1 5 Indeed, "[t]he Court's Commerce Clause
jurisprudence has 'eschewed formalism for a sensitive, case-by-case analysis of
purposes and effects.'"" Once formalist classifications are abandoned, at their core,
both resale royalties and state tax regulate the stream of income coming to a resident
.5. IMS Health Inc. v. Mills, 616 F.3d 7, 29 n.27 (1st Cir. 2010).
152 Am. Beverage Ass'n v. Snyder, 735 F.3d 362, 378 (6th
Cir. 2013).
153 See, e.g., Comptroller of Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1794 (2015); ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 478-90 (5th ed. 2015).
1

Sam Francis Found. v. Christies, Inc., 784 F.3d 1320, 1324 (9th Cir. 2015).

CHEMERINSKY, supra note 153, at 478 ("In general, the same basic principles apply to state
taxation of interstate commerce as to state regulation of commerce . . . ."); Adam B. Thimmesch, A
Unifying Approach to Nexus Under the DormantCommerce Clause, 116 MICH. L. REv. ONLINE 101, 105
(2018) ("Regardless of whether under the tax or nontax formulation, the Court's requirements are all
instrumental to the basic goal underlying its dormant Commerce Clause doctrine the pursuit of a
common national market.").
155

Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1796.
' South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2094 (2018) (quoting West Lynn Creamery, Inc.
v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 201 (1994)).
16
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from out-of-state activities. If the focus is, as the Supreme Court implied, on the
rationales for the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine,158 then from an "economic
impact" perspective, the effects of ARR are quite similar to those of state taxes.
The dormant Commerce Clause prohibits states from placing an undue burden
on interstate commerce."' Here, the only relevant parties whose actions might be
affected by state tax or state-enacted ARR are the payors-sellers. However, from
their perspective there is little difference between the duty to pay resale royalties and
a duty to pay taxes for the sale of artworks.' Both duties do not directly restrict the
transaction itself but require remission of a certain percentage thereof to a third party.
From the payor-seller's perspective, the identity of the ultimate beneficiary of the
payment seems irrelevant. Because the payor is the relevant economic actor in this
scenario, there seems to be no real differences between the impact of state tax and
state-enacted ARR on interstate commerce. Granted, ARR can impact out-of-state
transactions. For example, if royalties are due just for sales at public auctions, sellers
might be incentivized to use private sales instead or to hold on to works for longer.

'

However, that would have been the exact effect if a state decided to tax the income
of its residents from out-of-state sales of art at auctions.' 6
Therefore, it seems that, from a dormant Commerce Clause perspective, there are
significant similarities between state-enacted ARR and state income tax. This,
however, does not conclude the inquiry. Indeed, states are not free to impose any tax
they wish on out-of-state transactions. The Supreme Court caselaw places four
requirements on state taxation of out-of-state transactions: "it (1) applies to an
activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State, (2) is fairly apportioned, (3)

.ss

The Supreme Court recently summarized these rationales as: "First, state regulations may not

discriminate against interstate commerce; and second, States may not impose undue burdens on interstate
commerce." Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2091; see also Thimmesch, supra note 155, at 102 (describing the
doctrine as "an exercise of judicial power to override state autonomy in support of the framers' goal of a
common national market").
1" United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 548, 579-80 (1995).
'6 In Sam Francis, the Ninth Circuit implied that the CRRA might be more burdensome than state
tax because it requires the seller to seek out the artists and pay them directly. Sam Francis Found. v.
Christies, Inc., 784 F.3d 1320, 1324 (9th Cir. 2015). The court did not focus on this argument, and for
good reasons. As is typical to ARR legislation, the CRRA states that payment should be made to the artist,
but if she is not found quickly-ninety days in the case of the CRRA-it should be remitted to an
agency-a state agency in the case of the CRRA-that will transfer it to the artist. CAL. CIV. CODE §
986(a)(2) (West 2019). The CRRA, like similar ARR bills, does not prescribe any special actions that a
seller needs to take to locate such artists nor does it provide for liability for a sluggish search, provided
that the royalties were transferred on time to the state agency. Id. § 986(a)(3). In other words, the Ninth
Circuit was simply wrong to suggest that "[i]f the seller or the seller's agent fails to locate the artist
adequately, the artist may sue for damages plus attorney fees." Sam FrancisFound, 784 F.3d at 1324 n. 1.
Liability under the CRRA is triggered when "a seller .. . fails to pay an artist ... orfails to transfersuch
amount to the Arts Council." CAL. CIV. CODE § 986(a)(3) (West 2019) (emphasis added).
161 Cf Sam Francis, 784 F.3d at 1323 (pointing out that "if a California resident has a part-time
apartment in New York, buys a sculpture in New York from a North Dakota artist to furnish her apartment,
and later sells the sculpture to a friend in New York, [the CRRA] requires the payment of a royalty to the
North Dakota artist-even if the sculpture, the artist, and the buyer never traveled to, or had any
connection with, California" but failing to notice that the same is true if California law would have
required its residents to pay tax on out-of-state income, which it does).
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does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and (4) is fairly related to the
services the State provides."l 62
In analyzing the long-arm of state-enacted ARR schemes, it is fruitful to
distinguish between the burden on state residents and that on their out-of-state agents.
Burdening those agents-e.g., Sotheby's and Christie's-might be problematic from
a dormant Commerce Clause perspective. The question is whether those companies
have enough connection to a state that passed an ARR statute that it can be burdened
by its regulatory power? The relevant activity itself-an out-of-state sale-is
probably not enough and does not create a substantial nexus with the state.
Recently, in South Dakota v. Wayfair, the Supreme Court reexamined the nexus
requirement in connection with a state law that required out-of-state corporations to
collect payments, in that case, sales and use tax, that residents were obliged to pay
for online purchases.' Over a strongly worded dissent, the Court held that physical
presence in the taxing state is not needed." Nevertheless, as the Court explained, a
substantial nexus is still required and that "[S]uch a nexus is established when the
taxpayer [or collector] 'avails itself of the substantial privilege of carrying on
business' in that jurisdiction."' 65
While the exact scope of the nexus requirement post- Wayfair is unclear,'6 it is
unlikely that it is satisfied just by serving a seller who is a resident of a certain state.
Indeed, an auction house does not "avail[] itself of the substantial privilege of
carrying on business"' 6 1 in a state by a mere sale of a property of that state's resident.
In fact, it's hard to see any benefits, substantial or not, direct or indirect, that the state
bestows on the auction house in such a scenario. The question is therefore whether
there are other factors that create enough nexus between California and the auction
houses. Christie's, for example, is not incorporated in California and, until 2017, did
not have offices there,' 6 8 and therefore, before 2017, it is doubtful California could
have forced Christie's to comply with the CRRA, regardless of the residency of
Christie's clients.
While it is obviously easier to enforce an ARR scheme on a centralized
organization, such as the major auction house, a dormant Commerce Clause analysis
of the nexus requirement might undermine the legality of such a scheme. The nexus
rule is designed to prevent companies and individuals from being subject to layers
of regulations,' 6 9 and in this case, because auction houses serve the residents of all
states, it shields companies like Christie's from complying with the resale royalties
62

'

afair, 138 S. Ct. at 2091; see also Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274,286-87 (1977).
Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2087.
' Id. at 2099.
161 Id. (quoting Polar Tankers, Inc. v. City of Valdez, 557 U.S. 1, 11 (2009)).
166 See generally Thimmesch, supra note
155.
161 Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at
2099.
16 See About Christie'sLos Angeles, CHRISTIE'S (2019), https://www.christies.comlexhibitions/losangeles [https://perma.cc/8QHD-NQAJ].
169 Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2093 ("The Quill majority expressed concern that without the physical
presence rule 'a state tax might unduly burden interstate commerce' by subjecting retailers to
tax-collection obligations in thousands of different taxing jurisdictions." (quoting Quill Corp. v. North
Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 313 n.6 (1992))).
161
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and other long-arm rules of all states.
The analysis concerning residents is different. Residency itself can establish a
substantial nexus to a state, and therefore, states can regulate the stream of income
of their residents. Nevertheless, in doing so, states must make sure not to violate the
dormant Commerce Clause in other ways, and, in particular, to make sure that their
regulations do not discriminate against interstate commerce.
The CRRA might violate the dormant Commerce Clause when it comes to
residents because it does not account for the potential problem of double charges. 170
When it comes to states' taxation, the Supreme Court applies what is known as the
"internal consistency" test to evaluate this question: "This test, which helps courts
identify tax schemes that discriminate against interstate commerce, 'looks to the
structure of the tax at issue to see whether its identical application by every State in
the Union would place interstate commerce at a disadvantage as compared with
71
commerce intrastate.""

The CRRA fails this test. If every state in the Union would have passed an act
identical to the CRRA, then a sale by a resident of State A in State B would have
been charged resale royalties twice: once by the State or residency (A) and once by
the State in which the sale occurred (B). In comparison, State A residents would have
to pay royalties only once for sales in State A. Therefore, the CRRA discriminates
against interstate commerce and is unconstitutional.
This unconstitutionality in the CRRA is, however, easily fixable. A state that
wishes to avoid this illegality just needs to account for it. For example, the state can
still require its residents to pay resale royalties, even for out-of-state sales, if it gives
credit for royalties that are paid under the law of the state in which the transaction
took place. Such an act will not discriminate against interstate commerce.
While this Section focuses on the comparison between ARR and taxation of a
sale, and thus it utilizes the tax-related caselaw, a similar result could have been
reached under the non-tax related dormant Commerce Clause caselaw. Since the
CRRA affects out-of-state activity, it can be scrutinized under the dormant
Commerce Clause jurisprudence. The first step in such an inquiry is considering
whether it discriminates against inter-state commerce.1 72 In principle, ARR statutes,
at least if they account for the possibility of double-charges, discussed above, do not
discriminate against inter-state commerce because they do not create burdens on nonresidents or out-of-state transactions that residents or in-state transactions are
exempted from. As such, it is hard to see how they promote any protectionist
motivation or goals.
Once a state law is determined to be nondiscriminatory it will likely survive a
dormant Commerce Clause challenge.1 73 In fact, it has been more than thirty-five
years since the Supreme Court invalidated a nondiscriminatory state or local law
`o This argument was not raised in the recent litigation before the Ninth Circuit.
"' Comptroller of Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1802 (2015) (quoting Oklahoma Tax
Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 185 (1995)).
172 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 153, at 455.
17 Id. at 462 ("Generally, although certainly not always, a court upholds the law once it decides that
it is not discriminatory.").
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because it was unduly burdensome on interstate commerce.17 4 Specifically, courts
apply the Pike balancing test, which states:
Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local
public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental,
it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such
commerce is clearly
175
excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.
While the Pike test provides courts with enormous discretion,"' and is therefore
somewhat unpredictable, it is unlikely that the CRRA is one of the rare state laws
that fail that test. The CRRA represents an attempt by California to improve the
wellbeing of local artists. As already discussed, burdening out-of-state transactions
promotes that goal because it prevents sellers from easily circumventing it.
Therefore, even if the CRRA does not eventually benefit artists,' 7 7 as was discussed
above, its burden on out-of-state transactions is minimal, as it only requires a small
payment to a state agency, which means that it likely survives dormant Commerce
Clause scrutiny.

The conclusion is that the Ninth Circuit oversimplified the constitutionality
question concerning the CRRA application to out-of-state transactions. State ARR
might be able to survive dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny, subject to two main
constraints. First, and most important, it probably cannot apply to out-of-state agents
who have no contact that satisfies the nexus requirement to the state. In other words,
it is quite likely that an auction house cannot be burdened by state-enacted ARR
unless it has some connection to the state, such as conducting businesses therein.
Second, state-enacted ARR that is triggered by either residency or the location of a
transaction must account for the possibility of double payment. Indeed, the analysis
concerning the impact of the state ARR scheme and its constitutionality must
carefully balance conflicting interests and cannot be decided based on a per se rule.
B. Preemptionby the CopyrightAct
The Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution states that "the Laws of the
United States . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land.""'

From this Clause

174 Brannon P. Denning, The Dormant Commerce Clause Wynnes Won Wins One: Five Takes on
Wynne and Direct Marketing Association, 100 Minn. L. Rev. Headnotes 103, 115 (2016); see Edgar v.

MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 646 (1982).
" Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
76

CHEMERINSKY, supra note 153, at 462; see Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., Inc., 486

U.S. 888, 897 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("This process is ordinarily called 'balancing,' but the scale
analogy is not really appropriate, since the interests on both sides are incommensurate. It is more like
judging whether a particular line is longer than a particular rock is heavy." (citation omitted)).
'' See supra PartII for a discussion concerning the desirability and impacts of ARR schemes.
178 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.
2.
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emerged the federal preemption doctrine under which "state laws that conflict with
federal law are 'without effect.""17 The Supreme Court case law identifies three
main ways in which state and federal laws may conflict. First, when Congress states
that certain state laws are preempted the conflict is "expressed."'s 0 Second, field
preemption exists "[w]hen Congress intends federal law to 'occupy the field."""
Third, conflict preemption exists "to the extent of any conflict with a federal
statute."' 82 State law can also be considered conflict preempted if it is an obstacle to
the purpose and goals of the federal legislation.' 83
The preemption of the CRRA was discussed by the Ninth Circuit in two cases.
In Morseburg v. Balyon, the court held that the CRRA does not conflict with the
Copyright Act of 1909." In Close v. Sotheby's, Inc., the court held that the CRRA
is expressly preempted by the Copyright Act of 1976, although, due to Morseburg
and the principle of stare decisis, it is not preempted under the conflict preemption
doctrine.'8" This section considers those questions and takes a critical look into those
decisions.
i. Does State-Enacted ARR Conflict with the Copyright Act?
Evaluating the tension between state laws and the federal Copyright Act is a
complex task. The last major case in which the Supreme Court addressed the
preemption power of the Copyright Act was Goldstein v. California,decided in 1973
when the Copyright Act of 1909 was still in effect.' In that case, the Court held that
Congress did not intend to occupy the field and that the Constitution does not
preclude states from creating their own copyright-like mechanisms.' 87 Still, the Court
continued, state law is preempted if it conflicts with the purpose and objectives of
the Copyright Act.'
Evaluating whether state-enacted ARR conflicts with the Copyright Act therefore
requires an understanding of the relevant federal scheme and role that state law plays
within that scheme.
Federal copyright law creates property rights in intangible information goods but

"9 Altria Grp. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70,76 (2008) (quoting Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725,746 (1981)).
18o Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992).
' Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372 (2000) (quoting California v. ARC
America Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 100 (1989)).
8
1 2 Id.
13 See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). Another form of conflict preemption is found
"where 'compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility."' Arizona v. United
States, 567 U.S. 387, 399 (2012) (quoting Florida Line & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132,
142-43 (1963)). This form of preemption, sometimes referred to as actual conflict preemption, is
irrelevant to state-enacted ARR.

1` Morseburg v. Balyon, 621 F.2d 972, 978 (9th Cir. 1980).
.as Close v. Sotheby's, Inc., 894 F.3d 1061, 1068 (9th Cir. 2018).
186 See Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 551-52 (1973). The Court addressed copyright
preemption again, almost in passing, in Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 709-11 (1984).
18 Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 567.
118 See id. at 569-70.
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leaves the regulation of the markets in which those rights are bought and sold to state
law.' As a result of Erie RailroadCo. v. Tompkins" the legal infrastructure for
much of our market economy is rooted in state laws: contract law, corporate law,
payment methods and secured transaction laws, and more. Therefore, as a practical
matter, federal copyright law cannot operate on its own. Federal copyright law is the
roof to a structure that state laws build and sustain.
If state law provides the framework on which federal copyright law operates, it
obviously affects it. In other words, state laws systematically, routinely, and
unavoidably impact the operation of federal copyright law. The mere effect of one
over the other does not, in itself, justify preemption. It is therefore not surprising that
in two decisions the Supreme Court rejected challenges to states' laws although they
affected the rights of copyright holders.191
That, of course, does not mean that states are free to operate without considering
the federal interests as expressed in the Copyright Act. But caution is warranted
before finding state laws, especially those that regulate market transactions,
preempted. States laws that regulate creative industries should be preempted only
when they pose a significant obstacle to federal policy and goals.
When it comes to state-enacted ARR, the federal scheme in question has to do
with the right to control the distribution of copyrighted goods. The Copyright Act
provides that copyright owners have "the exclusive right . . . to distribute
copies . . . of the copyrighted work to the public."l 92 That right is, however,

significantly curtailed by the principles of the first sale doctrine. Under that
doctrine-also known as copyright exhaustion-"the owner of a particular copy
. . . lawfully made under this title . . . is entitled, without the authority of the

copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy."'93 In
other words, copyright owners have the right to control when every copy of their
copyrighted protected work is placed in the stream of commerce. However, once
they are placed there (i.e., sold) with their authorization, the copyright owners' rights
with respect to those specific copies are exhausted, meaning that they can now be
freely transferred to others.
There is a certain tension between this federal scheme and ARR. The federal
scheme requires the copyright owner's consent in primary markets, but it frees
"'See David Nimmer et al., The Metamorphosis of Contract into Expand, 87 CAUF. L. REV. 17,
24-29 (1999); Guy A. Rub, Copyright Survives: Rethinking the Copyright-ContractConflict, 103 VA. L.
REv. 1141, 1152, 1165 (2017).
'9 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (holding that federal courts do not have the power to create general federal
common law when hearing state law claims under diversity jurisdiction, thus limiting the development of
federal law in areas such as contract and private property law).
1" Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387, 394, 403-04 (1941) (holding that Florida can enforce a specific law
that was designed to extensively regulate the relationship between music composers, publishers, and
copyright owners); Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 126, 131 (1932) (holding that Georgia can tax
the royalties from copyrighted movies). See also Associated Film Distribution Corp. v. Thornburgh, 683
F.2d 808 (3d Cir. 1982) (rejecting a challenge to a Pennsylvania statutes that regulated the relationship
between movie distributor and theaters).
192 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (2012).
93
Id. § 109(a).

680

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 107

secondary markets from that restraint. ARR is a legal scheme that affects those
secondary markets and creates legal norms that do not exist under federal law.
Nevertheless, suggesting that this tension by itselfmeans that state-enacted ARR are
preempted--as the Ninth Circuit came close to declaring in Close' 9 4 -is absurd. We
already saw that state laws systematically affect markets, including secondary
markets, in copyrighted goods. Taxing income from copyrighted goods, which the
Supreme Court explicitly allowed in Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal,ios is an example for
such a permissible action.
The relevant question is, therefore, whether the goals of the federal
scheme-and, in particular, the policies underlying the first sale doctrine-are
significantly undermined by a state's ARR scheme. As I have explored elsewhere,
the case law and literature identified several possible non-exclusive rationales for
that doctrine.1

96

The main justification for copyright exhaustion has to do with transaction costs,
as the first sale doctrine commonly eliminates the need to gets the copyright owner's
consent for transactions in secondary markets.19 7 For example, in Kirtsaengv. John
Wiley & Sons, Inc., its last case on this matter, the Supreme Court stressed that
without the first sale doctrine "libraries [will need] to obtain permission . .. before
circulating or otherwise distributing . .. books," which, the Court continues, entails
significant costs:
How can [the libraries] find, say, the copyright owner of a foreign book,
perhaps written decades ago? ... And, even where addresses can be found,
the costs of finding them, contacting owners, and negotiating may be high
indeed. 98
The Court also addressed the impact of that increase in transaction costs on
others from booksellers to companies that engage in trade in sophisticated
technological products that embed copyrighted materials.'9
None of those concerns or "parade of horribles," however, applies to ARR.
'` See Close v. Sotheby's, Inc., 894 F.3d 1061, 1073-74 (9th Cir. 2018).

Fox Film Corp., 286 U.S. at 131.
See Rub, supranote 12, at 773. It should be noted that scholars disagree as to whether the first sale
doctrine can preempt state law at all. Compare John F. Duffy & Richard M. Hynes, Common Law vs.
Statutory Bases of PatentExhaustion, 103 VA. L. REv. ONLINE 1, 14 (2017) ("[T]he exhaustion doctrine
should not be preempting or invalidating non-IP legal mechanisms . . . ."), with Ariel Katz, Aaron
Perzanowski, & Guy A. Rub, The Interaction of Exhaustion and the General Law, 102 VA. L. REV.
ONLINE 8, 22 (2016) ("[Fjederal IP law does not give state commercial law unlimited power to regulate
'1

196

secondary markets. . . . the power of states to create certain legal regimes . . . is limited by federal

preemption law.").
19. The first sale doctrine also allows public display of copies of copyrighted materials in some
circumstances. 17 U.S.C. § 109(c). That rule is irrelevant to the discussion in this Section.
' Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568 U.S. 519, 541 (2013).
99
' Id. at 541-43. Similar arguments were made in the literature as well. See, e.g., Aaron Perzanowski
& Jason Schultz, DigitalExhaustion, 58 UCLA L. REv. 889, 896-97 (2011); Rub, supra note 12, at 78992 (claiming that the reduction of information costs should be the main justification for copyright
exhaustion).
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Unlike distribution rights under the Copyright Act, which, without the first sale
doctrine, would have been triggered upon any change in possession, including, for
example, a loan, ARR are triggered much less frequently-only upon certain sales.
More importantly, unlike distribution rights under the Copyright Act, once they are
triggered, ARR are quite cheap to manage: the parties do not need to seek the artists,
the copyright owners, or any other third party, or secure their permission prior to the
sale. And even after the sale, the seller can simply remit the resale royalties to a
central entity that will distribute it to the artists.
The differences from a transaction costs perspective do not end here. An
additional dramatic difference between distribution rights under copyright law and
ARR under state law has to do with those who are subject to the right. Distribution
rights, if not exhausted, affect the entire chain of possession of a good. When a seller
infringes the copyright by selling an item,200 the item itself becomes tainted: every
future possessor of that copy will likely be infringing the distribution right. That
feature of copyright law-which is driven by the nature of copyright as an in-rem
property right-raises a significant transaction costs concern.2 01
A similar concern does not exist with respect to ARR. Only sellers (and, in some
cases, their agents) are liable for the ARR payment. The buyer and third parties are
not affected by ARR. The sale is valid whether or not royalties were paid. Indeed,.
the buyers' rights in the item sold are not affected by the payment of royalties or lack
thereof. And even for the sellers the information costs are minimal. For example,
under the CRRA, the duty to pay royalties applies to sellers in California or by
California residents.202 Sellers know their state or residency and the location of a
sale. In addition, a seller only needs to know if the right expired or not. Because the
right expires twenty years after the artist dies, 203 all that the seller needs to know is
whether the artist is still alive or recently deceased. 2 0 Practically all sellers of
expensive artworks-the CRRA, like all ARR schemes, is limited to those
works-already know that information.2 05
Overall, from the seller's perspective, the added transaction costs from ARR

20 Such an infringement is common in those cases in which the first sale doctrine is inapplicable, for
example, when the item was originally licensed and not sold. 17 U.S.C. § 109(d) (2012); see also Vernor
v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102, 1103-04 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding a downstream possessor liable for

copyright infringement for selling an item that was allegedly originally licensed and not sold).
201 See, e.g., Christina Mulligan, A Numerus ClaususPrinciplefor Intellectual Property, 80 TENN. L.

REV. 235, 275-76 (2013); Rub, supra note 12, at 790.
202 CAL. CIV. CODE § 986(a) (West
2019).
203 Id. § 986(a)(7).
204 In fact, ARR can be designed to eliminate even those modest costs. For example, ARR
can place
the burden on the artists to approach sellers and prove their rights in any case of doubt. Another possibility
is to require the sellers in such situation to pay the ARR to a central agency, which will investigate the
matter and/or transfer the funds for the benefits of the public or artists in general. Those cases in which
the seller does not know who the artist is or if she is alive are likely very rare.
205 As an anecdote, one can easily find on the websites of Sotheby's and Christie's the year that the
artist was born and died for every work that was auctioned in March-April 2018 in a transaction that would
have resulted in resale royalty payment under the ART Act. This is how Sprigman & I easily figured out
their age for our study. See Sprigman & Rub, supra note 65.
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schemes seem minimal. 2 06 As such, resale rights do not seem to conflict or undermine
the goals of the federal first sale doctrine. 207 This result is unsurprising. As was
discussed throughout this Part, ARR are quite similar to a tax scheme with different
beneficiaries. Sales taxes, while obviously affecting the markets to which they apply,
typically do not harm them to the point that conflicts with federal policy. 208
ii. Does the Copyright Act Expressly Preempt State-Enacted ARR
Section 301(a) of the Copyright Act includes an express preemption provision:
[A]ll legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive
rights within the general scope of copyright ... are governed exclusively
by this title ... no person is entitled to any .. . equivalent right in any such
2
work under the common law or statutes of any State. 09

While conflict preemption and copyright express preemption typically work in
tandem,210 their scopes do not completely overlap. One of the stated goals of section
301 was to eliminate certain competition with federal law, regardless of the actual
harm that that competition caused. 2 1 ' In other words, it was clearly Congress's
intention that states would not create copyright-like rights whether or not those rights
undermine any other federal policy.
Courts typically use the extra element test to evaluate the equivalency between
2. As further discussed in Section H.D, administrating the payment scheme entails additional costs,
which might be significant. However, those costs do not affect the parties to the sale transaction and are
thus irrelevant to the discussion in this Section.
207 While the main rationale of the first sale doctrine is reducing transaction costs, and while the
Supreme Court focused on that rationale, the literature identified a few additional motivations. Even if
those additional justifications for the first sale doctrine in general are convincing, which is not without
doubt, they seem inapplicable to ARR. For example, copyright exhaustion can foster a used goods market,
but to a large degree, this concern is irrelevant in art markets where artworks are typically unique and thus
the secondary market mostly doesn't compete with the primary one. Some argue that copyright exhaustion
also helps some organizations, such as libraries, preserve old works, see R. Anthony Reese, The FirstSale
Doctrine in the Era of DigitalNetworks, 44 B.C. L. REV. 577, 603-10 (2003), but it is hard to see how
ARR, which apply to expensive artworks, will undermine their preservation. Finally, some claim that
copyright exhaustion promotes privacy by preventing the copyright owner from collecting certain data
concerning the use of the work. Perzanowski & Schultz, supranote 199, at 896. That concern also seems
quite peripheral in the context of ARR and it can easily be addressed by an ARR scheme if decision
makers perceive secrecy as a public good (which they might or might not). The CRRA, for example, does
not require an auction house to report the identity of the buyer or the seller of any artwork. See CAL. CIV.
CODE § 986(a)(1) (West 2019).
208 Obviously, even a permissible tax can just mask a more restrictive policy, which might run afoul
to federal policy. See Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 572 (2012). The Ninth Circuit
recognized that possibility in Morseburg v. Balyon, 621 F.2d 972, 978 (9th Cir. 1980) (stating that "the
possibility of the imposition by the state of very high royalty rates and more than one state 'taxing' a
single sale suggests that resale royalty acts under certain circumstances could make transfer of the work
of fine art a practical impossibility" but noting that the CRRA did not fall under that exception).
20 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2012).
2 10
See generallyGuy A. Rub, A Less-FormalisticCopyrightPreemption,24 J. INIELL PROP. L. 327 (2017).
211 See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 129-31 (1976); Rub, supra note 210, at 333-34.
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state and federal law.212 They compare the elements of the state cause of action to
the federal one to identify differences. 21 3 Under this test, state-enacted resale rights
are likely not equivalent to any of the exclusive rights under the Copyright Act,
including its distribution rights.
Some may argue that the rights are equivalent because they are triggered by the
same event-the sale of a copy 214 -but that argument is inaccurate. The triggering
event is actually different. Infringement of the distribution rights under the Copyright
Act happens when a copy is transferred (i.e., changes possession or is sold). But
liability under an ARR scheme, including the CRRA, is triggered much later when
the seller fails to pay royalties within the timeframe set forth in the relevant statute. 215
While this difference might look insignificant by itself it points to a more
meaningful distinction concerning the nature of the right itself. ARR only oblige the
seller to pay but they do not give the right-holder-i.e., the artist-any power to
intervene in the transaction itself. This is dramatically different from the exclusive
right of distribution.
In Close, the Ninth Circuit missed that point by describing the distribution right
under the Copyright Act as one that "grants artists the right to receive full payment
on the first (and only the first) sale." 216 This is preposterous. The exclusive right
under the Copyright Act is not a right to be paid but a right to control the
distribution. 217 That is a cornerstone concept in copyright law. Copyright owners can
sell copies but they have no obligation to do so. The distribution right also allows
them to refuse distribution at all, to delay distribution, to allow it in one market and
prohibit or delay it in another, to set any price they wish, and so on. Violation of that
right triggers the full set of property remedies under federal law, including statutory
damages and criminal liability. 218 The Ninth Circuit ignored those attributions by
212 Rub, supra note 210, at 337-38.

See, e.g., Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195, 200 (2d Cir. 1983),
rev'd on other grounds, 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
214 E.g., Close v. Sotheby's, Inc., 894 F.3d 1061, 1070-71 (9th Cir. 2018); 2 MELVILLENIMMER&
DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8C.04 (2018) ("[I]t is the same conduct in relation to the same
subject matter that triggers either rights or immunities under both federal and state law."); David E.
Shipley, Droit de Suite, Copyright's First Sale Doctrine and Preemption of State Law, 38 HASTINGS
COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1, 25 (2017).
215 The CRRA gives sellers ninety days to transfer payment. CAL. CIV. CODE § 986(a)(2) (West 2019).
Focusing on the triggering event, as Nimmer and others have done, supra note 214, raises other concerns.
For example, it ignores the fact that there are multiple state laws that are triggered in connection with any
sale including laws that are triggered in connection specifically with the sale of artworks-from taxation
laws to state regulations of auctions. See, e.g., Patty Gerstenblith, PictureImperfect: AttemptedRegulation
of the Art Market, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 501, 516-520, 554-55 (1988) (exploring state laws that
regulate public auctions of artworks, and in particular New York's Arts and Cultural Affairs Law). In
addition, the argument ignores other differences such as those with respect to the identity of the rightbolder: the holder of the distribution rights is the copyright owner while the holder of the resale royalty
rights is the artist. The Ninth Circuit completely ignored that distinction. The court, for example, mentions
that "the first sale doctrine limits artists' right to payment to the first sale." Close, 894 F.3d at 1071.
However, the first sale doctrine limits the rights of the copyright owner and not the artist."
216 Close, 894 F.3d at
1070.
217 See 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (2012).
218 Id. §§ 504, 506.
213
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claiming that both rights are "right[s] ... to payment."219 In doing so it not only
severely misdescribed the distribution right, but also ignored well-established
caselaw, including by the Ninth Circuit itself, that distinguishes between the
exclusive rights under the Copyright Act and a right to be paid under state law in
other contexts. 220

Indeed, the differences between a duty to pay royalties and the significantly
broader exclusive right to control distribution seem to create a qualitative distinction
between the two that should allow state-enacted ARR to survive an express
preemption challenge.
CONCLUSIONS

I find the idea of Artists' Resale Royalties misguided at best. Elsewhere I
explained that it is based on ill-advised romantic notions, myth, and folklore
concerning artistic creation and artistic markets, on unwise historical developments,
and on a set of myopic assumptions. 221 ARR legislation is ineffective, inefficient,
and regressively unjust. I am therefore happy that Congress, so far, has rejected any
attempt to pass such a scheme on the federal level.
This Article, however, suggests that there could be value, if limited, to allowing
states to experiment with ARR. I do not think that the value of such a legal
experiment necessarily outweighs the harm from ARR-it probably does not-but
that does not mean that there is no such value. Similarly, just because many, myself
included, think that enacting ARR, even by states, is unwise, that does not mean that
the Constitution or other federal laws prohibit states from doing so. States are
allowed to experiment with ill-advised policies, including ARR. Subject to minor
restrictions, federal law allows them to do so.

Close, 894 F.3d at 1070.
220 For example, multiple courts held that a contractual promise to pay for copying is not preempted
because "the right to be paid for the use of the work is not one of those [exclusive] rights [under the
Copyright Act]." Wrench LLC v. Taco Bell Corp., 256 F.3d 446, 456 (6th Cir. 2001); see Forest Park
Pictures v. Universal Television Network, Inc., 683 F.3d 424,433 (2d Cir. 2012) ("A claim for breach of
a contract including a promise to pay is qualitatively different from a suit to vindicate a right included in
the Copyright Act and is not subject to preemption."); see also Montz v. Pilgrim Films & Television, Inc.,
606 F.3d 1153, 1157-58 (9th Cir. 2010), on reh'g en banc, 649 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc).
221 Rub, supra note 18, at 1-2.
219

